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Abstract
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increase) in the levels of costs facing these institutions face. Results can be explored from multiple
perspectives, given that the set of explanatory factors is also multiple. However, the most interesting
result relates to the varying effect of each covariate depending on each municipality’s specific debt
level, which suggests that economic policy recommendations should not be homogeneous across local
governments.
Keywords: debt, local government, quantile regression
JEL Classification: D60, H71, H72, H74, H75
Communications to: Emili Tortosa-Ausina, Departament d’Economia, Universitat Jaume I,
Campus del Riu Sec, 12071 Castelló de la Plana, Spain. Tel.: +34 964387168, fax: +34 964728591,
e-mail: tortosa@uji.es
∗All three authors are grateful for the financial support of Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (ECO2010-
18967/ECON and ECO2011-27227/ECON). Maria Teresa Balaguer-Coll also acknowledges the financial support
of Fundació Caixa Castelló-Bancaixa (P1.1B2012-07), and Emili Tortosa-Ausina is grateful for that of Generalitat
Valenciana (PROMETEO/2009/066). The usual disclaimer applies.
1. Introduction
Over recent years the problems of local treasury departments have increasingly become a
focus of attention and concern in several euro area countries. Among the numerous problems
affecting these departments, some of the most serious are related to high debt levels, which
are now a focus of concern for local politicians, since it is frequently the case that the only
way they can fulfill their commitments is through borrowing. It also presents a problem for
public administration managers, as they are aware that higher levels of debt in their local
administrations will lead to increased fiscal pressure. Politicians at a national level are also
concerned, since indebtedness in numerous local councils will inevitably have an impact on
the national economy.
In the particular case of Spain, on which we focus, local councils have become responsible
for a growing number of powers (although still much lower compared to regions or comu-
nidades autónomas), with a corresponding increase in the functions they perform, and resulting
into higher expenditure levels. In addition, their basic resources are often insufficient to keep
pace with the rate of growth of their expenditure needs (López-Hernández et al., 2012).1 These
circumstances have led to high levels of indebtedness in most local government administra-
tions. Although the problem of local debt is relatively modest on a national scale, due to the
lower importance of the local public sector compared to the other public administrations (cen-
tral and regional),2 it has become a threat to local government solvency and moreover, may
have a negative effect on macroeconomic financial stability.
The severity of these issues has increased remarkably since the start of the financial crisis,
which was followed by a real economic crisis, resulting in the burst of the housing bubble, a
deep recession, and rising unemployment, which more than doubles the average rate in the
European Union (EU). This new macroeconomic scenario has had a remarkable impact on the
public sector, leading to very high levels of deficit across all strata of public administrations
considered, i.e. central, regional or local—although the level of total debt is still lower than
that of many other EU countries. In this new economic context, local governments have not
been left unscathed, and for most of them the financial difficulties affecting them practically
since the Spanish constitution was approved in 1978 have been exacerbated. The crisis has
led to a sharp decline in municipal revenues while, simultaneously, their costs have either
1See also Zafra-Gómez et al. (2013) and González-Gómez et al. (2011) for related problems of Spanish munici-
palities.
2The Spanish regions or comunidades autónomas (autonomous communities) correspond to level NUTS3 of the
European Union (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics), whereas municipalities correspond to level LAU2
(Local Administrative Units).
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stagnated or even increased, which impels local governments to find new tools for dealing
with the new financial scenario (Brusca Alijalde et al., 2012). Therefore, it seems reasonable to
design policies which take into account the major sources of debt for Spanish municipalities.
Several contributions have been analyzing the factors influencing past levels of local gov-
ernment debt, some examples of which include Inman and Fitts (1990), or Kiewiet and Szakaty
(1996). These and related studies have dealt with the general issue of monitoring local govern-
ment debt. Related to this literature, other relevant contributions have consideredmore specific
questions such as the need to guarantee a balanced budget in the long run (Poterba, 1997), to
preserve the principle of intergenerational equity when issuing debt (Musgrave, 1989), or to
minimize the use of debt as a political instrument to prevent a disproportionate rise of taxes
in constituencies (Cabasés et al., 2007).
The literature exploring explicitly the determinants of municipal debt, however, is not es-
pecially large, although some of the contributions are relevant. Cross-country studies are
virtually nonexistent, which introduces certain difficulties when reviewing the international
literature. Some previous relevant studies focusing on specific countries include, among oth-
ers, Cropf and Wendel (1998), who examine the UK case, Ashworth et al. (2005) and Bastiaens
et al. (2001), who analyze Flemish municipalities, or Baber and Gore (2008) and Bridges (2005),
who focus on US local governments.
Taking this background into consideration, the objective of this paper is to analyze whether
certain economic, political or social factors influence levels of debt in Spanish local government
administrations. In this particular context, Guillamón et al. (2011) provide a recent summary
of the literature focusing on different aspects of municipal debt. Our contribution to this
growing literature is twofold. On the one hand, we attempt to reveal the extent to which
the use of debt stems from factors that can be controlled, and over which managers can have
an influence, or otherwise. In this general context, the existent literature finds some relevant
variables explaining the level of municipal debt. On the other hand, we provide a different
perspective on how to evaluate the impact of each explanatory variable on municipalities’ debt.
Specifically, the available empirical literature, neither applied to the Spanish case or to dif-
ferent scenarios, has not considered the possibility that the effect of certain variables could
depend on the level of debt of each particular local government, since all of them focused on
the observable effects regarding the average level of debt. As a result, it might well be the case
that a variable with a specific average impact could play a very different role depending on how
indebted is the municipality under scrutiny. For instance, when relating the level of municipal
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debt to fiscal capacity, for local governments with few debts we can expect that the greater the
fiscal capacity—i.e. the more revenues coming from the respective municipal resources—the
lower the need to raise funds from external borrowing. On the opposite side, local govern-
ments having high fiscal capacity can make major investments because they may find easier to
raise money by increasing their level of debt beyond the reasonable limits for municipalities
presenting a poor fiscal capacity. Summing up, in contrast to the existent literature, we provide
a different perspective in order to disentangle whether or not the variables explaining the level
of municipal debt can be controlled by managers.
Our results can be helpful when designing strategic plans to reduce the level of debt be-
cause the first decisions to be made should concern to variables that have a significant impact
and, in one way or another, are easily influenced by public managers. In particular, we found
that for most of the variables, there existed a varying effect on debt, which largely contributed
to explain some of the “mixed” findings in the literature; in other cases, the effect had even
opposite signs for municipalities with differing levels of debt. Obviously, the combination of the
two dimensions (degree of controllability and analysis for varying levels of debt) influences the
level of severity of the problems caused by the existence of high levels of debt in municipalities.
The paper is structured in six sections. After this introduction, section 2 briefly outlines
the theoretical framework regarding the determinants of local government debt, and their
likely impacts, in order to discover whether managers can exert any influence on them. After
presenting the empirical model in section 3, we provide information on the selected variables
in section 4. The results of the analysis are analyzed in section 5 and, finally, section 6 reports
the main conclusions of the study.
2. Theoretical framework: forces that influence local governments’ public debt
The literature on the determinants of municipalities’ debt is heterogeneous in several respects.
Given that differences can be quite remarkable, following Cropf and Wendel (1998) we have
considered three general types of forces that can impact on municipal debt policies, namely,
financial (or economic), political, and social forces. Some of them can be controlled by local
governments, but others lie beyond their influence. However, due to the increasing impor-
tance of debt for growth in many cities around the world, and also due to the general increase
in indebtedness (which clashes with the austerity policies being implemented in many Euro-
pean countries), it is important to understand which factors are having a stronger effect on
municipal debt patterns, and their likely impact on city policies.
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2.1. Fiscal/financial forces
The first of these financial covariates can be broadly defined as “capital expenditure”. We may
term it INVEST, since these expenditures are included in those municipal budget categories
corresponding to physical capital investments. Specifically, we will define it as total capi-
tal expenditures (capital transfers plus acquisitions of capital goods) divided by population.
However, the variable is partially ambiguous, since there is no standard definition of what it
exactly represents—even in the Spanish case. For instance, some authors such as Benito and
Bastida (2004, 2005) define it as a ratio of real investments and capital transfers to total expen-
ditures. However, other authors (Vallés et al., 2003; Cabasés et al., 2007) calculate it as the ratio
of real investment to GDP, and refer to this variable as intergenerational equity—since future
generations will also benefit from the capital investments that current generations may make.
In contrast, Escudero (2002) defines it as the consolidated non-financial fixed assets per capita,
whereas Fernández Llera et al. (2004) confine the contents of this variable to real investments
only. In general—or, more exactly, on average—we can expect a positive relationship between
debt and this variable. This occurs in the particular case we are dealing with, as Spanish law3
establishes that local governments can resort to long or short term public or private credit in
any of its forms in order to finance their investment expenditure. The exact definition and
descriptive statistics for this variable are provided in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
The second of the selected variables is net savings, which we may refer to as NETSAV,
and can broadly be described as the available funds municipalities can use to conduct their
own investments. It corresponds to the difference between gross savings minus amortization
expenses. Gross savings (which can be defined, following Fernández Llera et al. (2004), as
the difference between current income minus current expenses) indicate local governments’
capacity to cover financial amortization. Hence, the lower the level of gross savings, the higher
will be the need to resort to borrowing. Previous contributions using this variable, although
considering a slightly different definition, are Brusca and Labrador (1998), or Cabasés et al.
(2007). The former authors consider a gross savings index in their use of the variables, whereas
the latter define it as the ratio of net savings to GDP.
In this respect, Cabasés et al. (2007) also note how local governments that have an austere
current expenditure policy, that obtain higher current income, or that plan debt amortizations
appropriately, have a greater financing capacity, and are less likely to resort to borrowing
to fund their investment expenses. Therefore, we may hypothesize a negative relationship
3LRHL, Ley Reguladora de Haciendas Locales, Law 39/1988 December 28th.
4
between the levels of debt and net savings; in other words, when an institution has positive
net savings, the need to resort to borrowing might be, cæteris paribus, lower.
Some previous contributions in the particular case of the debt levels of Spanish municipali-
ties have considered a variable that corresponds to the ratio of non-financial surplus to deficit.
We will refer to this variable as BUDGET which, in accounting terms (i.e. in terms of budget
categories) can be broadly defined as the difference between the sum of the net recognized
expenditures and the sum of net recognized revenues. However, this variable has been de-
fined in different ways in the literature. For example, whereas Benito and Bastida (2004, 2005)
calculate it in relative values, Brusca and Labrador (1998) consider total budgetary revenues
and expenditure—in other words, the difference between total budgetary revenues and total
budgetary expenditure, what they term budgetary deficit.
Although the specific definition of this variable might be subject to various interpretations,
the sign of the impact on the levels of debt are not. If non-financial expenditures are higher
than non-financial revenues, there will be a non-financial deficit and, therefore, it may be
expected that the local government will have to go further into debt in order to balance such a
deficit. Therefore, if we consider this variable as the ratio of non-financial budget expenditure
to non-financial budget revenue, which we will refer to as BUDGET, its relation to debt should
be positive, since local governments will turn to this resource more in order to balance the non-
financial deficit.
The literature has also been considering a variable reflecting each municipality’s own fiscal
capacity, which is usually defined as the ratio of direct taxes, indirect taxes, and revenues
from other taxes to all expenditures. It indicates the percentage of total revenues (excluding
indebtedness) represented by municipalities’ own resources, and some authors such as Vallés
et al. (2003) refer to this variable as “fiscal responsibility”—although they define it slightly
differently, dividing by GDP. These authors point out that the relationship between own fiscal
capacity, which we may refer to as FISCCAP, and the level of debt is unclear since, in principle,
municipalities that have more of their own resources will be under less pressure to borrow.
However, the opposite effect may occur, as municipalities with more of their own resources
will face lower financial risks and will therefore be granted certain advantages when accessing
loans.
Finally, amongst the financial variables the literature has also included what we could
refer to as “expenditure commitment” (EXPCOMM), which would correspond to the sum
of personnel and financial expenditures divided by total expenditures. According to some
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authors such as Fernández Llera et al. (2004), the quantities in the numerator are usually very
rigid (they are especially difficult to reduce), at least in the short run and, therefore, given such
an inflexibility, municipalities might be impelled to issue debt. Therefore, the link we might
expect between this variable and the levels of debt is positive.
2.2. Socioeconomic forces
The second set of variables we will consider can be broadly defined as socioeconomic variables.
In this case, the number of available studies from which to choose the covariates is broader, as
most of the variables included in this category have a more standard definition.
If our dependent variable were debt, without dividing it by population, one might consider
as a key determinant the size of the municipality, measured by its population. In the literature
the vast majority of authors consider that the effect of this variable on debt should be positive,
since municipalities with a higher number of inhabitants are obliged to provide more services,
as established by the Spanish law on local governments. Benito and Bastida (2004, 2005),
Farnham (1985), or Fernández Llera et al. (2004), among many others, have put forward this
argument.
However, Escudero (2002) considers that its effect is ambiguous and unclear, given that
economies or diseconomies of scale in investments can alter the sign, depending on how the
municipality’s size is classified as established in the Law on Local Treasury Departments. In
addition to this, considering size itself does not allow direct comparisons among municipalities
of different sizes. Therefore, in both models considered we will be dividing by population and,
consequently, it cannot enter the analysis as an explanatory factor.
Apart from population, some authors (Benito and Bastida, 2004, 2005) have included in the
model the level of tourism (TOURISM). Tourist municipalities must face higher expenditure
on infrastructures and a higher demand for services than other cities and, as a result, they
will need to borrow more in order to meet this additional expenditure. The expected sign
for this variable with regard to debt level should therefore be positive. The tourism variable
has been used not only by Benito and Bastida (2005) and Benito and Bastida (2004), who
introduced two dummy variables to differentiate between coastal and inland municipalities,
but also by Escudero (2002), who used the tourism index from the “Anuario Económico de
España” (Spanish Economic Yearbook) published by La Caixa Foundation.4
Previous studies have also considered per capita income. The link with the level of mu-
4See http://www.anuarieco.lacaixa.comunicacions.com.
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nicipal debt is explained, among others, by Farnham (1985), who indicates that this variable
would be reflecting the influence of a positive income elasticity of demand for capital goods,
which would imply a positive link between this variable and debt. However, there is no total
consensus on this point, and the expected sign for this variable is partly debatable; while some
authors such as Clingermayer and Wood (1995) or Kiewiet and Szakaty (1996) consider its
effect to be positive, others such as Adams (1977) claim a negative relationship.
This variable, also available through the Spanish Economic Yearbook, is estimated on the
base of available household income figures by province provided in the INE5 Regional Ac-
counting section. In this particular Spanish case, previous studies considering this information
include Benito and Bastida (2005), Benito and Bastida (2004), Cabasés et al. (2007), Escudero
(2002), or Vallés et al. (2003), among others, who have used per capita income level as a possible
indicator of economic level.
In our particular study we will not use economic level exactly since it is no longer available
but rather the level of economic activity, which we will refer to as ACTIVITY. For year
2008 onwards, only the variable measuring economic activity is available. This is the one
we use and, in addition, we consider that its link with a municipality’s possible debt level is
stronger than when considering per capita income, as those local governments operating in
environments where the general economic activity is more intense will have to provide their
constituencies with more and, probably, more complex services, which generally imply higher
costs.
The literature has also been considering the density of the municipality (DENSITY), mea-
sured as inhabitants per square kilometer. Several recent contributions have considered the
relation of this, or related variables, with municipality debt. For instance, according to Hortas-
Rico and Solé-Ollé (2010), the urban spatial structure of many Spanish cities, measured as
urbanized land per person, not only has an environmental impact, but also a major impact on
municipal finances. Benito et al. (2010) also consider similar issues. Specifically, they evaluate
the impact of urban sprawl on municipal expenditures, finding that the higher the population
density, the lower the total expenditures and current expenditures per capita which, in princi-
ple, would lead to lower levels of debt (negative relationship). This finding, in the opinion of
Benito et al. (2010), would favor those voices asking for “smarter” growth in municipalities.
5“Instituto Nacional de Estadística” (Spanish Bureau of Statistics).
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2.3. Political forces
Numerous studies have associated aspects of a political nature (which we will refer to as polit-
ical factors) with debt, such as political fragmentation, ideology (progressive or conservative)
or the length of time in power. Although it is a highly nuanced question, the number of
contributions in the field is remarkable, and these studies have been applied to very different
contexts.
As indicated in Benito and Bastida (2004), political theory has traditionally claimed that
left wing governments are more lax regarding governmental financial discipline. Therefore,
this type of government would advocate a bigger public sector, generally with more powers,
than right wing governments, which would ultimately become more indebted. Although a
substantial number of studies have tested and corroborated this theory (see, for instance Blais
and Nadeau, 1992; Dickson and Yu, 1997; Galli and Rossi, 2002), others have found the link
was not significant (see, for instance, Abizadeh and Gray, 1993). In contrast some studies,
albeit fewer in number, conclude that right-wing governments accumulate more debt when
facing a higher probability of defeat; one example is Pettersson-Lidbom (2001), who examines
debt accumulation among local governments in Sweden.
Other studies have also focused on related issues such as political fragmentation, or how
long the governing parties remain in power. For example, Ashworth et al. (2005) analyze how
greater political fragmentation leads to higher levels of debt and public deficit. However, in
their study on a sample of 48 states in the USA, Clingermayer and Wood (1995) found that
divided government did not lead to higher volumes of debt in the long term, and Bunch (1991)
found that when the same party remains in power for various years (regardless of political
ideology) they create public entities to provide loans in order to get round debt restrictions.
Unfortunately, our database did not contain information on these variables and, therefore,
their use had to be discarded. We will refer to this variable as POLITICAL, which is a dummy
variable taking the value of 1 for municipalities governed by left-wing parties.
There are also some Spanish regions (Navarre and the Basque Country) which are classi-
fied under a special foral regime, which essentially gives them more independence in terms
of managing transferred taxes and powers. In terms of municipalities, the minimum services
that the local governments of these regions must supply is different from those that the rest of
Spanish municipalities must provide. Therefore, one might hypothesize that these discrepan-
cies turn into differences in terms of levels of municipalities’ indebtedness. In our particular
case, we will refer to this variable as FORAL, and we will define it as a dummy variable taking
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the value of 1 for municipalities in the foral regions.
The expected sign for this variable could a priori be undefined. However, some authors
such as Fernández Llera et al. (2004) consider that foral regions have created a relatively higher
number of public firms (compared to the rest of Spain). Therefore, some municipalities might
have decided to outsource some services which would lead to lower levels of municipal debt,
pointing to a negative link with this variable.6
We can also consider the FORAL variable to be strongly linked to the issue of decentraliza-
tion. Recent contributions have explored this issue in depth, such as, for instance, Lago-Peñas
et al. (2011), or Pike et al. (2012). In the particular case of Spain, some authors such as Balaguer-
Coll et al. (2010, 2013) have dealt with the specific issue of how the different levels of powers
Spanish municipalities have might impact on the efficiency with which they provide their ser-
vices. Specifically, Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013) argue that some municipalities with lower levels
of powers might go beyond the legal minimum, providing more services than those legally
required. This rationale would point to higher levels of debt. Therefore, one might hypothe-
size a negative link between the level of powers and the level of municipal debt. The variable
POWERS takes the value of 1 for municipalities with fewer powers. Therefore, the sign one
might expect is actually positive—because of how the variable is defined.
3. Evaluating the determinants of local debt using regression quantiles
In order to analyze how the variables reviewed in the previous section influence levels of debt,
we will specify a model in which the dependent variable is the level of municipal debt per
inhabitant. Consistent with the contents of the previous section, this model will consider the
three groups of explanatory variables examined earlier (financial, socioeconomic and political),
whose impact on debt operates through the mechanisms described above.
Since the dependent variable is the total municipal debt per inhabitant, many of the selected
covariates will also be expressed as shares of population. Therefore, we might initially consider
6Other municipalities decide to cooperate to provide local public services (Bel et al., 2013).
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the following empirical model:
(DEBT/POP)i = β0 + β1 INVESTi + β2NETSAVi + β3BUDGETi
+ β4FISCCAPi + β5EXPCOMMi
+ β6TOURISMi + β7ACTIVITYi + β8DENSITYi
+ β9ELECTIONi + β10FORALi + β11POWERSi + ε i
(1)
Each of the lines constituting Equation (1) contains the three different types of variables con-
sidered in section 4. The first line, afar the intercept β0, contains the financial variables referred
to in subsection 2.1 (INVEST, NETSAV, BUDGET, FISCCAP and EXPCOMM), the second
line displays the socioeconomic variables described in subsection 2.2 (TOURISM, ACTIVITY
and DENSITY), and the third one includes the political variables, described in subsection 2.3
(ELECTION, FORAL and POWERS). ε i is the error term corresponding to municipality i,
with i = 1, . . . , n.
Models such as (1) are typically estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Alterna-
tively, we will consider quantile regression (Koenker, 2005), which allows estimation of the
conditional quantiles of a response variable distribution (in our case, the debt of each munici-
pality) in a linear model that provides a much more detailed and comprehensive view of likely
causal relationships between our variables of interest. Specifically, the estimation of models
such as those presented in the previous section are relevant, but they confine the analysis to
providing information on average impacts, which in our case would be the average impact for
the average municipality. Using this instrument, the analyst will only be able to determine
whether the mean effect of a covariate on a response variable is significant or not.
Quantile regression is an alternative to conditional-mean modeling, in which conditional
quantiles are modeled as functions or predictors. It is a natural extension of the linear-
regression model. The novelty is that, whereas the linear-regression framework specifies the
change in the conditional mean of the dependent variable, the quantile regression model spec-
ifies changes in the conditional quantile. Therefore, it enables the problems referred to above
to be tackled with more precision. Applications are growing in a variety of fields (see, for
instance, the survey by Buchinsky, 1998), but they are still largely outnumbered by those us-
ing linear models which focus exclusively on average behavior. Therefore, quantile regression
does not confine the analysis to regression against averages (and hence it is not limited in its
explanatory values) but rather also uses information obtained from the underlying distribution
of the dependent variable.
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In our case, quantile regression enables us to consider the entire distribution of local
debt. Hence, we will be able to provide a more complete story of the relationship between
variables—i.e. local debt and the relevant covariates. We can therefore specifically investigate
whether, for municipalities whose debt is low (corresponding to the lower tail of the distribu-
tion, or to the lower quantiles), the sign and significance of the determinants is the same as for
other municipalities whose debt is high (those lying in the higher tails of the distribution, and
corresponding to the highest quantiles). This modelling will enable to design specific policies
depending on each particular financial situation. Therefore, in the present study we consider
that both low- and highly-indebted municipalities (especially the latter) are of interest in their
own right—we do not want to consider them as outliers—and quantile regression allows us to
analyze them in greater detail.7
Compared with basic models estimated via OLS, regression quantiles specify the τth quan-
tile of the conditional distribution of yi given x as a linear function of the covariates. As
described by Koenker (2005), the estimation is carried out by minimizing the following equa-
tion:
Min
β∈Rk
∑
i∈{i:yi≥x′β}
τ|yi − x
′β|+ ∑
i∈{i:yi<x′β}
(1− τ)|yi − x′β| (2)
where yi is the same dependent variable as in equation (1) for municipality i, x is the vector
of explanatory variables, k is the number of explanatory variables, and τ represents the vector
containing each quantile. The vector of coefficients β to be estimated will differ depending on
the particular quantile.
In the particular field of local government finances, these ideas have been barely explored,
although there are some exceptions. For instance, Benito et al. (2010) find that the impact
of population on municipal expenditures is not linear. Specifically, they find that population
yields economies of scale up to a limit, since the functions present a U-shape, as from the point
of the minimum per capita spending, if the population keeps on growing, per capita spending
rises.
4. Data description
The sample comprises a large set of Spanish municipalities for which budgetary information is
available for year 2008.8 It is important to note that, when selecting our budgetary information,
7In addition to this, the quantile regression estimator has other benefits such as being characteristically robust
to outliers on the dependent variable.
8The Spanish Ministry of Economy and Finance website provides information on budgetary implementations
up to and including 2008 (http://serviciosweb.meh.es/apps/EntidadesLocales/).
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we chose actual expenditure and revenues (net recognized assets and net recognized liabilities)
rather than budgetary data (final expenditure and revenue forecasts), despite the fact that
these budgetary implementations are not published promptly. If final forecasts had been used
instead of actual implementations, results could have been severely distorted, since forecasts
tend to underestimate expenditures and overestimate revenues.
Regarding the choice of year, we selected 2008 for a variety of reasons. First, it was the
year in which the crisis actually started in Spain, although the effects for local governments
were more evident the years after; therefore, its analysis provides a more unbiased view of
local governments’ finances. Second, in case we were interested in extending the analysis
to more recent years, the information on debt is updated with some lag (up to four years).
Finally, although extending the analysis to more years would grant the study with additional
robustness, the number of regression quantiles figures, as well as the number of tables would
increase the total length of the article to unreasonable limits.9
The choice of exogenous factors is guided by the theoretical framework presented in Section
2. Table 1 defines each one of the independent variables in the study, indicating also its
expected impact on debt according to the theoretical framework, and if the variable is either
controllable or non-controllable. Table 2 provides some summary statistics.
The different variables are provided by several sources. The fiscal variables are basically
obtained from the municipalities’ budgetary information—with the exception of population
or GDP and population, which are provided by the Spanish Bureau of Statistics (INE). In the
case of the socioeconomic forces, whereas TOURISM and ACTIVITY are provided by La
Caixa Foundation (Spanish Economic Yearbook), DENSITY is provided by the INE. Regard-
ing the political variables, the variables FORAL and POWERS have been constructed by the
authors, whereas the POLITICAL variable is provided by the Spanish Ministry of the Interior
(Ministerio del Interior).
5. Results
We report the results corresponding to the estimation of Model (2) in both Table 3 and Figures
1, 2 and 3. The results offer various subtleties compared to those one might obtain via OLS
regressions.10 Amongst the financial covariates, those which were found to be significant
throughout, and showed the expected signs were INVEST, NETSAV and BUDGET. However,
9However, these results are available from the authors upon request.
10These are available from the authors upon request, and were not reported for space reasons.
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as reported in Table 3, these are average effects which hide very disparate behaviors for the
different parts of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable (DEBT/POP). For
instance, the positive, and significant (average) effect found for INVEST is actually negative
for the lowest tails of DEBT/POP, i.e. for those municipalities with the lowest levels of debt.
However, as shown by the standard errors in parentheses, the effect is not significant for
quantiles τ = .05, τ = .10 and τ = .25. In contrast, the effect is not only positive and significant
for quantiles τ ≥ .50 but, in addition, the magnitude of the effect increases with the level of
debt. In the case of NETSAV results are also much richer than the OLS results. In this case, the
average negative, and significant, effect found is negative for all quantiles, as shown in Table 3,
but the magnitude of the effect is much higher for the upper tail of the distribution of debt.
In this case, however, the effect is also significant for all considered quantiles—with the sole
exception of τ = .05. The third financial variable which was found to be significant throughout
via OLS, i.e. BUDGET, also shows remarkable differences for the quantile regression analysis.
In this case, results are partly similar to those found for INVEST, although in this case the
lowest quantiles do not show a negative effect. In this case, the effect is positive throughout,
although significance holds only for the upper quantiles, and not for all of them. Analogously
to what we found for INVEST and NETSAV, the magnitude is also much higher for the most
indebted municipalities.
Those financial variables whose effect was not found to be significant on average, i.e.
FISCCAP and EXPCOMM, share with the rest of the financial variables the increasing mag-
nitude of the effect with the quantiles—i.e. the effect is always much stronger for the highest
quantiles. For both FISCCAP and EXPCOMM the sign of the effect changes depending on
the part of the distribution being analyzed—with a negative effect for the lower tail. In addi-
tion, some of the upper quantiles show a significant effect. Again, this behavior was completely
overlooked by OLS regressions.
These results are corroborated in Figure 1, which displays the graphical counterpart to the
results in Table 3 for the financial variables. As indicated in the figure, each sub-figure displays
the slopes corresponding to the financial variables of the estimated linear quantile regression
of Equation (2), which are plotted as functions of τ, i.e. the different quantiles, which are
represented on the horizontal axis, whereas the vertical axis represents the values of the slope
coefficients for each quantile (τ).
Interestingly, the solid horizontal red line in each sub-figure represents the OLS estimates,
and the dashed horizontal red lines represent 95% confidence bands. Comparing them with
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the slopes of the estimated quantiles, it is easy to understand how misleading it can be to
confine the analysis to OLS only. For instance, in the case of INVEST, we can observe that
the variable is significant for τ > .5 (approximately), since for values below this threshold the
(gray) confidence bands contain the 0. In the case of NETSAV, significance is only lost for the
very upper and lower tails of the distribution, whereas for BUDGET we find that for τ < .3
approximately the effect is not significant—at the 5% significance level. We can also notice how
the effect varies with the quantiles. In the case of FISCCAP and EXPCOMM the confidence
bands for OLS coefficients (dashed horizontal red lines) contain the zero, indicating that, on
average, these variables are not significant, as stated earlier. However, the confidence bands for
the estimated quantiles do not contain the zero for many of the quantiles (dashed black lines
inside the gray bands), especially in the case of FISCCAP, indicating the effect of this variable
is mostly positive.
In the case of the socioeconomic variables, one might a priori consider that the contribu-
tion of quantile regression would be minimal since, at least in the case of TOURISM and
ACTIVITY, the effect is positive for OLS—as indicated by the solid red line in Figures 2a and
2b, respectively. However, paralleling the findings for the financial variables, the magnitude of
the effect is much stronger for the most indebted municipalities, whereas the impact vanishes
for the lower quantiles and, in addition, significance is partly lost—especially in the case of
TOURISM, which is only significant for τ ≥ .50. In contrast, DENSITY is never significant
and, in addition, the effect presents an erratic pattern throughout quantiles, which naturally
leads to the conclusion that this variable is not significant at all.
Figures 2a, 2b and 2c provide graphical counterparts for the coefficients estimated for the
socioeconomic variables in Table 3. For both TOURISM and ACTIVITY the OLS results are
corroborated, with effects of increasing magnitude which, in the case of TOURISM, are not
significant for τ < .30. In contrast the effect of DENSITY is both low (very close to zero), not
significant, and without a clear sign.
Finally, the effect for the political variables also shows some nuances with respect to OLS.
The variable ELECTION, which takes the value of 1 for those municipalities governed by
left-wing governments, shows a positive effect throughout, corroborating what was found on
average (solid red line in Figure 3a). This would imply that, on average, these municipalities
have higher levels of debt. However, as shown in Table 3, the effect is not significant for
the highest quantiles—i.e. the most indebted municipalities have these high levels of debt
regardless of their political stance. Again, this result would be completely hidden by OLS.
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In the case of FORAL and POWERS, the nuances with respect to OLS are more marked.
Whereas the variable FORAL shows no particular pattern for OLS (the effect was low, and
not significant), for quantile regression (Table 3) the negative effect becomes positive, and
non-negligible) for the highest quantiles (τ = .90, τ = .95). However, in this case the effect
is not significant. Yet significance actually exists for some quantiles, in this case the lowest
ones (τ = .05 and τ = .25). Taking into account that FORAL is a dummy variable taking the
value of 1 for the foral regions (Navarre and the Basque Country), it would indicate that those
municipalities with the lowest levels of debt are located in these regions. In the case of the
municipalities with the highest levels, the effect is not significant.
Finally, the behavior of the decentralization variable (POWERS) is partly similar to that
found for FORAL, since the sign of the effect varies with the conditional distribution of debt.
In this case, however, there are more quantiles with a positive sign, and with significant effects.
Since POWERS takes the value of 1 for the municipalities with fewer powers, a positive effect
indicates that the municipalities with fewer powers have higher levels of debt. Results in Table
3 indicate this is actually the case for those municipalities with more debt, corresponding to
the highest quantiles, and this effect is very strong. In contrast, for those municipalities with
lower levels of debt, corresponding to the lowest quantiles, the effect is the opposite, and more
modest in magnitude.
The effects of the three political variables considered are visually corroborated in Figure 3,
which clearly shows clearly noticed how the effect of POLITICAL is present for most of the
selected quantiles, whereas in the case of FORAL it only holds for few of them. In the case of
POWERS, this effect is of the opposite sign (albeit significant) for both tails of the distribution
of debt.
The results from the OLS and quantile estimation help us to detect the asymmetric situation
of debts in Spanish local governments. On the one hand, municipalities having a low level of
debts seem to be affected by the overall economic activity, but not by the tourism activity. The
requirements concerning the level of investments do not appear to ’drive’ increased level of
debts. In other terms, the allocation of infrastructures seem to be financed without requiring
funds from financial institutions, which helps these municipalities to avoid financial pressures.
Cases with such characteristics can be taken as a ’best practice’ model on how to manage the
requirement of the external environment with an adequate structure of controllable budget
variables (as the regressors concerning net savings indicate).
Confronting the previous case, local governments having a high level of debts appear to
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be influenced both by tourism and economic activities, and by operating with more powers
in a decentralized environment, which can imply the requirement to offer a mixture of more
sophisticated services to their citizens. For these municipalities, the investments increase the
level of debts because control of the budgetary variables (i.e. the level of net savings) does
not seem to reduce the requirement to raise financial debts. The obvious implication from
this is that investments should be carefully monitored for municipalities offering complex
services and maintaining important levels of economic activities once a certain level of debts is
surpassed. In other words, to find an analogy from the private sector, a kind of ’debt covenant’
should be introduced as a way to regulate the financial management of local governments. This
regulation should only affect those municipalities having a level of debts beyond a determined
point. The results of the quantile regression are extremely useful to determine the upper limit
of the debts to regulate the level of municipal investments.
6. Concluding remarks
In Spanish public administration, all layers of government—central, regional and local—
contribute to public spending, and have varying levels of powers. Although municipalities
are clearly the level of government with the fewest less powers (the second decentralization,
from the central and regional governments to local governments actually never took place),
they are allowed to both raise local taxes and charge tariffs for the services they provide.
These and other revenues they obtain from different sources allow them to, depending on the
size of their populations, provide services such as day-care nurseries, public transport, waste
disposal, sewage, construction, management of sports centers and public green areas, etc.
The current economic and financial crisis has seriously affected (and is affecting) Euro-
pean public administrations. In the Spanish case, all layers are heavily affected. However,
there are many differences, since out of 17 regions (“comunidades autónomas”) some of them
are facing much higher deficits than others, especially those where the housing bubble was
largest—and, therefore, when it burst the effects were more devastating. In those regions, the
amount of revenues raised by regional governments has plummeted, whereas that of costs
has either remained constant or even risen. Stepping down to the local government level, one
finds a similar scenario, with the added problem that the number of municipalities is much
higher (8,112 municipalities vs. 17 regions) and, therefore, the levels of heterogeneity are also
much higher, with many municipalities facing extremely stringent financial needs, to which
the responses have differed remarkably.
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Under these circumstances, this paper has analyzed the main determinants of local gov-
ernment debt in Spain. This question has been partly approached in previous contributions,
which found relevant results. However, the previous literature implicitly assumed that the
impact of the different variables was homogeneous across the 8,112 municipalities, disregarding
the possibility that effects could vary for different quantiles of the distribution of municipal
debt. In other words, most of the subtleties that might exist were hidden by the fact that results
were summarized into an average effect. We consider that this might be an over-simplification,
since based only on this summary, economic policy recommendations would not be tuned to
match the intrinsic characteristics of each municipality.
Our results indicate that for most of the variables considered to have an impact on mu-
nicipalities’ debt, which were in line with those used by previous literature, the effects vary
considerably depending on the quantile of the conditional distribution of local government
debt. This implies that the explanations one might have previously found (explanations that
did not take into account these differing effects by quantile) should state that the impacts found
corresponded to average impacts. According to the analysis performed in this study, where we
considered three types of variables, namely, financial, socioeconomic, and political, the effects
are strong, and significant, for most of them. Interestingly, the effects differ greatly depending
on how indebted municipalities are, and in some cases the impacts were even opposite for
the lower and upper tails of the municipalities’ debt distribution—such as, for instance, the
variable reflecting devolution. In other cases, the effects were not significant for some parts of
the distribution, but for others these effects were positive and significant, and this happened
in a non-negligible, and relevant, number of instances. This is the case of, for instance, capital
expenditures, non-financial surplus (as a share of deficit), own fiscal capacity, or tourism.
These results indicate that the design of public policies that attempt to control local gov-
ernments’ costs, strongly encouraged by European Union institutions, and contemplated by
the recent update of the Stability and Growth Pact (2011), should take into account this varying
reality, which is very present in the case of Spanish local governments. Failing to do so would
lead to an design of public policies which, ultimately, could be ineffective in achieving the
objectives pursued.
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Table 1: Definition of the relevant variables
Type of variable Variable name Description Definition/Calculation Expected sign
Controllable/non-
controllable
(short-
term
basis)
Dependent variable
DEBT/POP Debt level per inhabitant (Total debt)/population
Independent variables
Financial/fiscal
INVEST Capital expenditures
(capital transfers plus acquisitions of capital
goods)/population (+) Controllable
NETSAV
Net savings (available funds to conduct invest-
ments)
(gross savings – amortization ex-
penses)/population (−)
Controllable/non-
controllable
BUDGET Non-financial deficit/non-financial surplus
(non-financial budget expenditures, headings
1 to 7 of NREa)/(non-financial budget revenue,
headings 1 to 7 of NRRb)
(+) Controllable
FISCCAP
Own fiscal capacity (revenues represented by
municipalities’ own resources)
(taxation revenues (NRRb headings 1 to
3))/(Total revenues)
(+/−) Controllable
EXPCOMM Expenditure commitment
(personnel and financial expenditures)/(total
expenditures) (+) Controllable
Socioeconomic
TOURISM Level of tourism
Index based on the (local) tax on economic
activity (or Impuesto de Actividades Económicas,
IAEc) with respect to tourism-oriented activi-
ties
(+) Non-controllable
ACTIVITY Level of economic activity
((Local tax on economic activity (IAEc) corre-
sponding to the municipality’s economic ac-
tivities)/(total IAEb revenues for all Spanish
municipalities))×100, 000
(+) Non-controllable
DENSITY Population density Inhabitants per km2 (−) Non-controllable
Political
POLITICAL Color of municipality’s governing party
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for mu-
nicipalities governed by left-wing parties, 0
otherwise
(+) Non-controllable
FORAL
Foral regions (Navarre and the Basque Coun-
try)
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for mu-
nicipalities in the foral regions (−) Non-controllable
POWERS Decentralization
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for mu-
nicipalities with less powers (+/−) Non-controllable
a NRE: Net Recognized Expenditures.
b NRR: Net Recognized Revenues.
c IAS: Impuesto de Actividades Económicas (local tax on economic activity).
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the relevant variables
Type of variable Variable name
# of
observations
Mean Std. Dev. 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile
Dependent variable
DEBT/POPa 1,381 0.2851 0.2873 0.0686 0.2134 0.4151
Independent variablesb
Financial/fiscal
INVESTa 1,381 1.0355 0.1827 0.9336 1.0120 1.1090
NETSAVa 1,381 87.8060 422.6137 –8.4856 51.7434 119.0209
BUDGET 1,381 1.0353 0.1827 0.9336 1.0118 1.1088
BUDGET 1,381 1.0355 0.1827 0.9336 1.0120 1.1090
FISCCAP 1,381 0.4357 0.1528 0.3212 0.4407 0.5425
EXPCOMM 1,381 0.6517 0.1268 0.5770 0.6635 0.7438
Socioeconomic
TOURISMc 1,381 52.8704 349.2460 0.0000 2.0000 10.0000
ACTIVITYc 1,381 56.4461 361.9620 2.0000 7.0000 23.0000
DENSITYd 1,381 0.0246 0.0355 0.0031 0.0119 0.0310
aIn logs; DEBT in thousands of e.
bAll the political variables used are dichotomous variables and therefore their values are not reported.
cBoth TOURISM and ACTIVITY are index numbers constructed by La Caixa Foundation. See “Anuario Económico de España” (Spanish Economic
Yearbook) for details (http://www.anuarieco.lacaixa.comunicacions.com).
dIn square kilometers per inhabitant (i.e. inverse of the usual definition of density).
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Table 3: Regression quantiles, all variables
Covariates
Dependent variable: DEBT/POP
Quantile (τ)
0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95
(Intercept) 0.146
(0.046)
0.220
(0.066)
0.123
(0.079)
−0.189
(0.086)
−1.012
(0.165)
−1.027
(0.264)
−1.243
(0.430)
Fiscal/financial
variables
INVEST −0.003
(0.002)
−0.006
(0.005)
−0.003
(0.006)
0.025
(0.009)
0.100
(0.010)
0.126
(0.029)
0.150
(0.045)
NETSAV −0.104
(0.103)
−0.495
(0.185)
−1.016
(0.244)
−2.037
(0.272)
−1.981
(0.508)
−2.961
(0.793)
−3.159
(1.163)
BUDGET 0.000
(0.006)
0.013
(0.023)
0.036
(0.035)
0.118
(0.045)
0.195
(0.065)
0.205
(0.109)
0.256
(0.183)
FISCCAP −0.009
(0.007)
−0.023
(0.017)
−0.001
(0.028)
0.158
(0.042)
0.126
(0.074)
0.157
(0.098)
0.137
(0.170)
EXPCOMM −0.011
(0.007)
−0.025
(0.033)
−0.081
(0.051)
−0.116
(0.060)
0.215
(0.111)
0.164
(0.180)
0.229
(0.290)
Socioeconomic
variables
TOURISM 0.001
(0.001)
0.004
(0.003)
0.003
(0.004)
0.023
(0.006)
0.032
(0.009)
0.059
(0.013)
0.069
(0.026)
ACTIVITY 0.003
(0.002)
0.012
(0.005)
0.041
(0.007)
0.049
(0.009)
0.103
(0.016)
0.088
(0.022)
0.097
(0.036)
DENSITY 0.000
(0.007)
−0.017
(0.050)
−0.046
(0.116)
−0.091
(0.193)
0.185
(0.233)
0.136
(0.198)
−0.142
(0.867)
Political variables
ELECTION 0.005
(0.003)
0.014
(0.006)
0.020
(0.007)
0.031
(0.009)
0.045
(0.017)
0.033
(0.028)
0.139
(0.048)
FORAL −0.039
(0.016)
−0.032
(0.036)
−0.083
(0.012)
−0.006
(0.076)
−0.008
(0.037)
0.161
(0.124)
0.151
(0.503)
POWERS −0.128
(0.045)
−0.183
(0.048)
−0.091
(0.034)
0.018
(0.036)
0.201
(0.071)
0.259
(0.086)
0.304
(0.161)
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Figure 1: Regression quantiles, financial/fiscal variables
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Notes: the slopes corresponding to the financial/fiscal covariates of the estimated linear quantile regression for model (2) are
plotted as a function of τ (i.e., the different quantiles), represented on the horizontal axis. The vertical axis represents the
values of the slope coefficients for each quantile (τ).
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Figure 2: Regression quantiles, socioeconomic variables
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Notes: the slopes corresponding to the financial/fiscal covariates of the estimated linear quantile regression for model (2) are
plotted as a function of τ (i.e., the different quantiles), represented on the horizontal axis. The vertical axis represents the
values of the slope coefficients for each quantile (τ).
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Figure 3: Regression quantiles, political variables
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Notes: the slopes corresponding to the financial/fiscal covariates of the estimated linear quantile regression for model (2) are
plotted as a function of τ (i.e., the different quantiles), represented on the horizontal axis. The vertical axis represents the
values of the slope coefficients for each quantile (τ).
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